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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from consolidated subcases that are part of the broader Coeur d’AleneSpokane River basin general stream adjudication. The United States, as trustee for the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe (“Tribe”), filed 353 claims to federal reserved water rights for the Tribe to fulfill
the purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. The State of Idaho and others objected. The
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District (“Water Court”) consolidated the claims related to the
Reservation (consolidated subcase No. 91-7755) and bifurcated the proceedings. In a May 3,
2017 decision, the district court addressed the nature of water rights held in trust for the Tribe,
including priority dates. The court left the quantification of rights for a later phase of litigation.
The United States claimed water rights on behalf of the Tribe in two general categories:
(1) rights to divert water for consumptive use in irrigation, domestic, commercial, and industrial
applications; and (2) rights to maintain instream flows, lake levels, seeps, springs, and wetlands
for the continuation of traditional tribal practices like hunting, fishing, plant gathering,
recreation, and cultural activities. Both categories of water rights are essential to fulfilling the
Coeur d’Alene Reservation’s general purpose: to serve as a permanent homeland for members of
the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.
These categories serve diverse purposes, but even the full quantity of water claimed has a
limited scope. Consumptive claims are tied only to lands owned by the United States and held in
trust for the Tribe or for an allottee or owned in fee by the Tribe, and such claims amount to less
than one percent of the total outflow of the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin. Domestic usage
claims are tied to the population of the Reservation. And agricultural claims have been tied to the
well-established practicably-irrigable acreage standard.
In its May 3, 3017, decision, the Water Court held that the United States established the
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Coeur d’Alene Reservation for the “primary purpose” of enabling tribal hunting, fishing,
domestic, and agricultural activities. The Water Court determined that the United States did not
reserve water for other traditional Tribal practices or for commercial or industrial uses—and that
those uses cannot be considered in quantifying the overall reserved right—because those uses are
“secondary” to the purposes of the reservation. This cramped interpretation of the federal
reserved right for Coeur d’Alene Reservation is contrary to decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and of various state supreme courts. Those decisions demonstrate that when the
United States established reservations to serve as tribal homelands, the United States impliedly
reserved water to support both traditional practices and future needs. They further demonstrate
that water required for commercial and industrial uses reasonably may be considered in
determining rights of use and in quantifying the water rights reserved for Indian reservations.
The Water Court also incorrectly rejected claims for off-reservation instream flows
required to protect on-reservation fisheries. It cannot be seriously disputed—and the Water Court
correctly found—that the United States established the Reservation in part to protect tribal
fisheries and fishing rights. Off-reservation stream flows necessary to protect the fish are not
different from off-reservation stream flows required to protect on-reservation water uses. Finally,
the Water Court erred in holding that non-consumptive water rights appurtenant to reservation
lands that were granted to private parties via allotment and homesteading (and then reacquired
for the Tribe) lost their time immemorial priority. Under federal law, these reserved water rights
appurtenant to lands held in trust for Indians are properly accorded a time-immemorial priority,
notwithstanding interim ownership and state-law rules that might have applied during that time.
B. Course of Proceedings
On March 23, 2006, the Idaho Legislature approved initiation of the Northern Idaho
Adjudication, a general stream adjudication for the determination of surface and ground water
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rights in the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River basin. Idaho Code § 42-1406B. The United States is a
party to the adjudication under the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666. The first basin to be
adjudicated by the Water Court is the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River drainage, which includes
the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation. On November 12, 2008, the Water Court issued a
Commencement Order for the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin General Adjudication setting
forth a process for filing of claims. On January 30, 2014, the United States filed 353 claims to
federal reserved water rights for the Tribe to fulfill the purpose of the Reservation. See R.8
(United States’ Cover Letter for Tribal Claims). 1 The Tribe entered an appearance on its own
behalf and joined in the claims. See R.4. On February 17, 2015, the court issued an order
consolidating all federal claims for water on the Reservation into one subcase and bifurcating
litigation of that subcase into issues of entitlement and quantification. R.461–62. The Water
Court has thus far considered—and this appeal involves—only issues of entitlement and of the
priority date to be assigned to different categories of water claims.
On motions for summary judgment, the United States argued that the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation was established in 1873 to create and maintain a permanent homeland for the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe. It argued that accomplishing this homeland purpose requires reserved water rights
that serve both traditional and modern uses, including rights for domestic, commercial,
municipal, and industrial uses; irrigated agriculture; instream flows for fish habitat; maintenance
of water levels in Coeur d’Alene Lake; and maintenance of wetlands, springs, and seeps. And the
United States argued that the water rights serving traditional subsistence uses (fishing, hunting,
gathering, and domestic) have a time-immemorial priority date, and modern uses (agriculture and
1

Citations to the Clerk’s Record on Appeal prepared jointly for this and the related
appeals regarding the Tribal claims (Idaho Supreme Court Nos. 45381, 45383, and 45384) are
designated as “R.#.”
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commercial/industrial) have a date-of-Reservation priority date. See R.2540–90; R.3511–3599;
R.4062–101; R.4356–63; R.4405–21.
After extensive briefing and argument, the Water Court (Judge Eric J. Wildman) issued
its ruling on entitlement on May 3, 2017. R.4310–33. The court rejected the United States’
contention that, when establishing the Reservation, the United States impliedly reserved all water
rights necessary to provide a homeland for the Tribe. Instead, the court held that United States
impliedly reserved only those water rights needed for what the court deemed to be the specific
“primary purposes” of the Reservation, namely, agriculture, domestic use, hunting, and fishing.
R.4317–23. The court therefore denied claims for rights to use water for commercial, industrial,
and plant gathering; for maintenance of Lake Coeur d’Alene levels (for purposes other than
fishing and hunting); and for other uses that it decided were “secondary purposes” of the
Reservation. R.4323–24. The court also rejected claims for the maintenance of instream flows
outside the Reservation boundaries for the protection of on-Reservation fisheries. R.4324–26.
The court recognized a time-immemorial priority date for hunting and fishing uses and held that
a date-of-reservation priority (which it determined to be 1873) applied to domestic and
agricultural water claims. R.4326–27. It applied a date-of-reacquisition priority for consumptive
claims for reservation lands reacquired by the Tribe following a period of private ownership due
to allotment and homestead grants. R.4327–28.
The United States and the Tribe jointly moved for reconsideration on two issues: first, the
apparent accidental dismissal of certain on-reservation instream flow claims for fishing purposes;
and second, rejection of plant gathering (along with fishing and hunting) as a primary purpose of
the Reservation. R.4356–63. The State and other objectors likewise sought reconsideration or
clarification on the priority date assigned to non-consumptive uses attached to reacquired lands.
On July 26, 2017, the court granted the motion of the United States and the Tribe to the extent
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that they sought to allow the fishery-supporting on-reservation instream flow claims to continue
to the quantification phase. R.4481–82. But the Water Court again rejected plant gathering as
one of the primary purposes of the Reservation, and it ruled that a date-of-reacquisition priority
date would apply to water rights on all reacquired lands, including for non-consumptive uses on
former allotments and homesteaded lands. R.4474; R.4480.
These decisions are now the subject of four appeals before this Court. See No. 45381
(appeal by State of Idaho); No. 45383 (appeal by Coeur d’Alene Tribe); No. 45384 (appeal by
North Idaho Water Rights Alliance, et al.). These appeals have a consolidated record on appeal,
see R.1–2, but briefing of the appeals is proceeding separately.
C. Statement of Facts
The U.S. Supreme Court detailed the history of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe and
establishment of its Reservation in Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (“Idaho II”),
which held that the United States holds submerged lands within the Coeur d’Alene Reservation
in trust for the benefit of the Tribe. The Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s aboriginal territory included more
than 3.5 million acres in what is now northern Idaho and northeastern Washington, including
Lake Coeur d’Alene, the St. Joe River, and surrounding areas. Id. at 265. As the Court explained:
“Tribal members traditionally used the lake and its related waterways for food, fiber,
transportation, recreation, and cultural activities. The Tribe depended on submerged lands for
everything from water potatoes harvested from the lake to fish weirs and traps anchored in
riverbeds and banks.” Id. (citations and footnote omitted). The United States acquired title to this
area under an 1846 treaty with Great Britain. Id. Then, as American immigration into the Tribe’s
territory became an increasing issue, President Johnson in 1867 issued an Executive Order
setting aside “a reservation of comparatively modest size.” Id. The Tribe was apparently unaware
of this Order, however, and in 1871 it petitioned the Government to set aside a reservation. Id. at
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265–66. “The Tribe found the 1867 boundaries unsatisfactory, due in part to their failure to make
adequate provision for fishing and other uses of important waterways.” Id. at 266. Accordingly,
when the Tribe again petitioned the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for an adequate reservation,
“it insisted on a reservation that included key river valleys because ‘we are not as yet quite up to
living on farming’ and ‘for a while yet we need have some hunting and fishing.’ ” Id. After
further negotiations, the Tribe agreed in 1873 to relinquish all claims to its aboriginal lands
outside the bounds of a larger reservation; in exchange, the United States would “set apart and
secure” “for the exclusive use of the Coeur d’Alene Indians, and to protect . . . from settlement or
occupancy by other persons.” Id. (quoting 1873 agreement). The reservation boundaries
described in the agreement included part of the St. Joe River and nearly all of Lake Coeur
d’Alene. Id. 2 The 1873 agreement was by its terms not binding without congressional approval,
but later that year “President Grant issued an Executive Order directing that the reservation
specified in the agreement be ‘withdrawn from sale and set apart as a reservation for the Coeur
d’Alene Indians.’ ” Id. at 266 (quoting Exec. Order of Nov. 8, 1873, reprinted in 1 C. Kapler,
Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties 837 (1904)); see also R.1868.
As of 1885, Congress still had neither ratified the 1873 agreement nor compensated the
Tribe, so the Tribe again petitioned for “a proper treaty” and compensation. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at
267; see also R.1869–72. After further negotiations, the Tribe agreed in 1887 to cede “all right,
title, and claim” to land outside their present reservation. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 267; R.1873–77.
Again, Congress did not immediately ratify this agreement. Instead, in 1889, the United States
and Tribe negotiated a new agreement under which the Tribe would cede the northern portion of
its reservation in exchange for $500,000. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 269–70; R.1882–84. Congress
2

The full text of the 1873 agreement may be found in various places in the record,
including R.1865–67 and R.4201–03.
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ratified the 1887 and 1889 agreements in 1890. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 270.
The Reservation boundaries have remained largely constant since that time, but control of
Reservation lands has evolved, most substantially as a result of the 1906 Indian Appropriations
Act, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 335–36 (June 21, 1906), which allowed allotment of the Coeur
d’Alene Reservation. Under that law, and over vigorous and near-universal objection by the
Tribe, see R.1750–51, each Indian on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation received an allotment of
160 acres; surplus lands—those not allotted or reserved for common Tribal purposes—were open
to settlement by non-Indians. 34 Stat. at 335–37. The result of this policy was that non-Indian
holdings of allotments on the Reservation soon far exceeded Indian holdings, due both to nonIndian homesteading and to the loss of Indian allotment ownership due to sale, forfeiture, or loss
in mortgage sale. See R.2244–50. The federal government reversed course on the Indian
allotment policy in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984. As
for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the result was eventual transfer back to the Tribe of only minimal
remaining surplus lands (i.e., lands that had not yet been homesteaded following the 1906
allotment Act). R.3101, 3105; R.799–802. Over the last few decades, the Tribe has endeavored
to reacquire lands alienated from Tribal control during allotment. See R.3108–10.
In this water rights adjudication case, the United States and Tribe retained historians who
prepared reports on the history of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, particularly with respect to the
circumstances surrounding the creation of the Reservation. See R.2627–28 (United States and
Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s Joint Statement of Facts, summarizing expert reports submitted in this
case). These expert reports thoroughly document the Tribe’s historical reliance on waterways for
fishing, hunting, gathering, trade, culture, and general survival from time immemorial through
(and beyond) Reservation creation; the Tribe’s initiation of agriculture on the Reservation due to
the federal government’s intent to promote that activity; and the Tribe’s demand for a reservation
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with waterways. See generally R.2632–72. Similarly, experts documented Tribal resistance to
federal allotment policy and the Tribe’s continued commitment to fighting for its water
resources. R.2671–76. And an expert explained the biological attributes of the fish species that
are the focus of the claims for instream flows to protect fish habitat, and why maintenance of fish
habitat that happens to be outside the Reservation boundaries is critical to effectuating the fishing
purpose of the Reservation. R.2676–78.
The United States’ water right claims on behalf of the Tribe fall into several categories,
all of which further the Reservation’s role as a permanent homeland for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.
The United States claimed non-consumptive water rights to support the Tribe’s hunting, fishing,
gathering, cultural practices, transportation, recreation, and related uses. These claims are for the
maintenance of certain flows or levels in Lake Coeur d’Alene and its associated waterways and
for seeps, springs, and wetlands on Reservation lands. These in-situ water rights allow for the
Tribe’s continued traditional activities on Reservation waters, which require protecting the
upstream habitat upon which the Tribe’s fishery depends. The claimed consumptive water rights
would entitle the Tribe to divert water for domestic, agricultural, municipal, commercial, and
industrial uses, which serve the Reservation’s homeland purpose by supporting basic domestic
needs and by aiding in the Tribe’s continued economic development and self-sufficiency.
In weighing the United States’ entitlement to water for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the
Water Court rejected the argument that the Reservation’s acknowledged “homeland” purpose
may be the basis for a reserved water right. Instead, the Water Court sought to identify particular
uses of water that it deemed so essential to the Reservation that only they supported reserved
water rights for the Tribe. Those uses, the court found, were only hunting, fishing, agriculture,
and domestic uses; only those uses may now be considered in the next phase of the adjudication
when the court determines the quantity of water reserved for the Tribe. Accordingly, the Water
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Court held that the Tribe is entitled to zero water for cultural practices, commercial or industrial
activities, plant gathering, transportation, or any other use not specifically approved. And
although it did not question the dependence of the Tribe’s on-Reservation fisheries on upstream
flows for spawning, the court denied any right to those flows if they happen to be needed outside
the Reservation boundaries. Finally, while the Water Court properly recognized that water rights
tied to traditional Tribal water uses hold a time-immemorial priority date, it undermined this
holding by excepting any such rights to maintain water for seeps, springs, and wetlands on
Reservation lands that were alienated from Tribal control through allotment or homesteading.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented in this appeal are:
(1)

whether the Water Court erred in holding that the reserved water right for the

Coeur d’Alene Reservation is limited to water needed for specified purposes that the Water
Court deemed “primary,” as opposed to all water reasonably necessary to provide a permanent
homeland for the Tribe (Section I.A);
(2)

whether the permanent homeland purpose of the Reservation encompasses the

Tribe’s traditional activities recognized by the Supreme Court in Idaho II, as well as commercial
and industrial activities required to achieve self-sufficiency, enabling these other uses to be
considered when defining and quantifying the Reservation’s water rights (Section I.B–D);
(3)

whether claims for instream flows outside of Reservation boundaries are properly

included as part of the Reservation’s water rights because they are necessary for protecting the
on-Reservation fishery (Section II); and
(4)

whether non-consumptive reserved water rights appurtenant to reacquired

reservation lands hold a time-immemorial priority date, notwithstanding the period of interim
private ownership due to allotment or homestead grants (Section III).

9

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court “employs the same
standard of review as the district court.” Pocatello v. State, 180 P.3d 1048, 1051 (Idaho 2008).
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
This court exercises “free review” over issues of law. Id.
ARGUMENT
I.

Establishment of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation included the implied
reservation of water to provide a permanent homeland for the Tribe.
Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court held that when the United States

sets aside an Indian reservation, it impliedly reserves sufficient water to fulfill the purposes of
the reservation, with the priority date established as of the date of the reservation. Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Indian reserved rights to water thus differ significantly from
the appropriative water rights that are typical of western states: they are not based on actual
diversion and beneficial use of water but instead are implied from the reservation of land, and
they are measured by the amount of water needed to accomplish the purposes of the reservation.
Critically, because these rights are implied, they need not be made explicit at any time during
negotiations between the Tribe and the United States, nor need they be expressly indicated in any
document formalizing the reservation. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1397, 1409 (9th Cir.
1983); In re Gen. Adjud. of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 75
(Ariz. 2001) (“Gila V”); Mont. ex rel. Greely v. Confed. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754,
764 (Mont. 1985). Instead, the scope of the water rights impliedly reserved to serve a federal
Indian reservation is generally determined with a view to several factors, such as the history of
the tribe and reservation at issue, including their traditional practices and their need to maintain
themselves under changed circumstances; the language of the treaty, order, or agreement that
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created the Indian reservation; and the canon of interpretation requiring agreements between the
federal government and Indians to be construed in a light favorable to the Indians. Colville
Confed. Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Washington v. Wash. State
Comm’l Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676, 680 (1979) (“Fishing Vessel”); Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 200, 206 (1999). A background principle
governing such interpretation is that that an agreement to confine a Tribe to a reservation “was
not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from them—a reservation of those not
granted.” United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905); see also Pocatello, 180 P.3d at
1057; United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353–54 (1941) (creation of Indian
reservation protects any pre-existing possessory rights of the Indians in absence of clear contrary
intent).
While there is some variation in how courts have defined the extent of reserved water
rights—varying from tribe to tribe and reservation to reservation—the United States Supreme
Court has made clear that reservations were established for the purpose of creating and
maintaining a permanent homeland for Indian people. The Water Court here erred by failing to
recognize this core purpose. Had it properly done so, the court would have (and should have)
determined that in the establishment of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, the United States
impliedly reserved water to satisfy both the present and the future needs of the Coeur d’Alene
Tribe. Those needs include sufficient water to allow the Tribe’s continued traditional activities
and the development of “modern” practices 3 to assist the Tribe in economic development and
self-sufficiency.
3

“Modern” herein refers to agriculture, commercial, and industrial development (i.e.
modern at the time of Reservation establishment in 1873), as distinguished from traditional
Tribal activities like hunting, fishing, gathering, cultural practices, etc.
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A. The Water Court erred by failing to recognize that the Supreme Court has
defined the key purpose of Indian reservations: to provide a permanent
homeland for Tribes.
The Supreme Court established the doctrine of implied water rights for federal
reservations in Winters. In that case, after non-Indian irrigators began diverting water from the
Milk River, depriving the downstream Fort Belknap Reservation of sufficient water for
irrigation, the United States brought suit on behalf of two tribes to establish their prior right to
water on the Reservation. The Fort Belknap Reservation was established through an agreement
between the Tribes and the United States that provided for a tract of land to be set aside as “a
permanent home and abiding place” for the Tribes. 207 U.S. at 565. Although the agreement did
not mention water or water rights, the Supreme Court concluded that the provision of land for the
Reservation impliedly reserved water sufficient to support the Tribes’ livelihood on the
Reservation. Id. at 576–77. The Court specifically recognized the necessity of water for irrigation
in desert environs, asked rhetorically whether the tribes would have agreed to “reduce the area of
their occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable or adequate,” and concluded that
neither the Indians nor the federal government would have intended to establish a reservation
absent sufficient water. Id. at 576. Winters thus poses the proper question to be asked in
determining the extent of the water impliedly reserved with the creation of an Indian reservation:
how much water is needed to accomplish this reservation’s purpose?
Here, the Water Court arrived at an unduly narrow answer in part by reframing the
question. Rather than recognizing that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was intended as a
permanent homeland for the Tribe and determining what water is needed to accomplish that
purpose, the Water Court instead sought and purported to find the more limited “primary”
purposes of the Reservation. The court then held that only those supposed “primary” purposes of
the Reservation enjoy implied federal reserved water rights. R.4316. The Water Court crafted

12

this methodology based on its interpretation of United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696
(1978). In that case, the Supreme Court addressed federal reserved water rights for the new
statutorily-directed specific uses of the Gila National Forest, held that those uses were
“secondary” uses of the Forest, and concluded that only the original purposes for the
establishment of the Forest enjoyed implied federal reserved water rights. Mistakenly applying
that framework fashioned for a circumstance very different from the initial reservation of land as
a permanent homeland for a tribe, the Water Court proceeded to reject the United States’
argument (based on Winters) that the purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was to provide a
permanent homeland for the Tribe and other Indians residing there. According to the court, such
purpose “is overly broad.” R.4318. The court reasoned that if the “homeland” could be the
primary purpose of an Indian reservation, and if “homeland” encompasses “every use of water
associated with the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation dating back to its inception over 130 years
ago,” then “the homeland theory fails to accommodate the notion of secondary purposes or, for
that matter, the notion that the reserved rights doctrine is intended to reserve water rights for
some, but not all, uses associated with a federal reservation of land.” R.4318–19.
In direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s recognition of the homeland purpose in
establishing an Indian reservation and with the Court’s conclusion that this purpose is the focus
for determining the water rights implied by the reservation of land, the Water Court opined that a
homeland purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation is “contrary to law,” R.4318. In Winters,
the Supreme Court recognized, first, that the reservation at issue there was established as “a
permanent home and abiding place”; and, second, that the tribe, in agreeing to cede its vast
territories in exchange for being confined to this reservation, could not have agreed to “give up
the waters which made [the reservation] valuable or adequate.” 207 U.S. at 565, 576. This
determination that Indian reservations are meant to be tribes’ homelands has never been
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abrogated, and it applies with equal force to the Coeur d’Alene Reservation as it did to the Indian
reservation at issue in Winters. Decades later, the Supreme Court further explained that the
implied reservation of water under Winters requires enough water “to make the reservation
livable,” and that it must account for both future and present needs of a tribe. Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 599, 600 (1963) (“Arizona I”). In contrast to the Water Court, other
courts have properly applied these binding precedents. The Supreme Court of Arizona relied on
Winters and Arizona I to hold that Indian reservations were “created as a ‘permanent home and
abiding place’ for the Indian people,” observing that this “broad” purpose must be “liberally
construed” to allow “tribes to achieve the twin goals of Indian self-determination and economic
self-sufficiency.” Gila V, 35 P.3d at 76 (quoting Walton, 647 F.2d at 47); see also Greely, 712
P.2d at 768. Just last year, the Ninth Circuit determined broadly that the primary purpose of the
Agua Caliente Reservation was “to create a home for the Tribe, and water was necessarily
implicated in that purpose.” Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water
Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 468, 469 (2017). The Water
Court erred by summarily dismissing the statements in Winters and in Arizona I about the
purpose of Indian reservations and by instead focusing on the fact that those decisions ultimately
concerned only water for irrigation. R.4319. Those decisions addressed water for irrigation
because that was the question presented in those cases.
In any event, even if New Mexico directly applies to Indian reservations, it did not alter
Winters. 4 New Mexico involved water rights for the Gila National Forest, which was reserved
4

The fundamental difference between reservations of land for homelands for Indian
tribes and reservations of land for national forests has caused some courts to wholly reject the
application of New Mexico in the Indian water rights context. In Gila V, for instance, the Arizona
Supreme Court reasoned that while “the primary purpose for which the federal government
reserves non-Indian land is strictly construed after careful examination,” reservations of land for
Indians “are construed liberally in the Indians’ favor” and their purposes “‘are given broader
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under the authority of the Organic Administration Act of 1897. That statute provided that the
purpose of such reservations was to conserve water flows and preserve timber. See 438 U.S. at
707 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 473 et seq.). The Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (“MUSYA”)
broadened the uses national forests would henceforth be administered to include aesthetic,
recreational, wildlife-preservation, and stockwatering. See id. at 713 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 528 et
seq.) In New Mexico, the Supreme Court addressed whether the uses specified in MUSYA
supported federal water reservations in addition to those that would fulfill the original purposes
of the forests. The Court held that while MUSYA broadened the use of national forests, it did not
indicate a broader reservation of water for those forests, which was limited to the original
purposes of the forest reservation at the time of the Organic Administration Act of 1897. Id.5 at
708, 714–15. Thus, while new reservations created after enactment of the 1960 MUSYA might
include implied reservations of water for this broader set of purposes, see id. at 715 n.22,
reservations under the Organic Act only had implied water rights tied to the original set of
purposes, id. at 718. Even assuming New Mexico’s primary/secondary framework applies here, it
requires only that the federal reservation of water rights be tied to the original purposes of the
Coeur d’Alene Reservation; any later-defined purposes of the reservation would have to be
interpretation in order to further the federal goal of Indian self sufficiency.’ ” 35 P.3d 68, 74
(quoting Greely, 712 P.2d at 768); see also William C. Canby, American Indian Law 435 (2004)
(“Although the purpose for which the federal government reserves other types of lands may be
strictly construed . . . the purposes of Indian reservations are necessarily entitled to broader
interpretation if the goal of Indian self-sufficiency is to be attained.”); Cohen’s Handbook of
Federal Indian Law § 19.03[4], at 1217 (2012) (“The significant differences between Indian
reservations and federal reserved lands indicate that the [primary-secondary] distinction should
not apply.”).
5

In doing so, the Court noted that some of the new uses enumerated in the 1960 Act
appeared to conflict with the original set of purposes, and that by “reaffirming the primacy of”
these original uses, Congress indicated its intent to reserve water for these original purposes
only. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 715.
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assessed to determine whether they were merely “secondary” uses that are not entitled to
federally-reserved water rights. But this case presents no later-defined uses that might be
categorized as “secondary” like the uses so categorized in New Mexico. New Mexico does not
alter Winters’ recognition that the original—or in the Water Court’s parlance, “primary”—
purpose of Indian reservations is to provide a permanent homeland for Indian people. Where
there is only an original (“primary”) purpose at issue, application of New Mexico properly results
in an outcome no different from application of Winters alone.
Moreover, the Water Court’s bare statement that a “homeland” purpose is too broad is
unsupported by any law, including the New Mexico decision on which the Water Court
principally relied. Providing a permanent, livable homeland may be a “broad” purpose that
potentially encompasses multiple uses of the land and associated uses of water, but the Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that federal reservations may be established for broad purposes:
in New Mexico itself, the Supreme Court recognized that a federal reservation for federal agency
purposes may have an “extremely broad” purpose. 438 U.S. at 707 n.14. New Mexico rejected
one purpose of the national forests—to “improve and protect the forest”—as a matter of statutory
construction, not because that purpose was overly broad or because of some other principle. Id. 6
There is no legal basis for the Water Court’s cramped understanding of the general purposes of
Indian reservations, and its approach to the water rights claims for the Coeur d’Alene

6

In recognizing the limits of the federal government’s reservation of national forests, the
Supreme Court observed that Congress would have been “primarily concerned with limiting the
President’s power to reserve the forest lands of the West.” 438 U.S. at 707 n.14. That point is
self-evidently not applicable to the establishment of an Indian reservation via executive order,
particularly given the long-established rule that Indian reservations be broadly interpreted in
Indians’ favor. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675–76 (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11
(1899); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S.
194 (1919); Winans, 198 U.S. 371).
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Reservation should be rejected as a matter of law.
Indeed, there can be no serious dispute that the United States created the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation as a homeland for that Tribe. While the Arizona Supreme Court urged against heavy
reliance on historical documents to discern the purpose for creating Indian reservations—as that
search tends to reveal more about the government’s motivations than the tribe’s, Gila V, 35 P.3d
at 75—the historical record here supports an intent to create a homeland for the Coeur d’Alene.
For instance, the 1873 agreement between the Tribe and federal government states that the
Indians will “make their homes upon the Reservation.” R.1866. And the 1887 agreement
between the Tribe and federal government (which recognizes the pre-existing 1873 reservation,
see R.1873, and which was ultimately ratified by Congress) agreed that “the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation shall be held forever as Indian land and as homes for the Coeur d’Alene Indians.”
Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 267 (emphasis added); see also R.1874. Even while erroneously rejecting
“homeland” as a purpose that could support a reservation of water here, the Water Court
acknowledged the uncontroversial fact that this was the Reservation’s purpose: “There is no
doubt that the United States intended to move the Coeur d’Alene people onto the lands reserved
to be the reservation with the aim that those lands be their homeland.” R.4319 (emphasis added).
In short, the Water Court plainly erred in parsing “primary” purposes and “secondary”
uses of the original Coeur d’Alene Reservation, as if New Mexico dictates that a federal
reservation in every instance must have both primary and secondary purposes. There is no such
dictate in New Mexico or any other relevant precedent.7 New Mexico’s holding instead rests on

7

The Ninth Circuit has thrice applied New Mexico in the Indian reservation context and
has never identified a “secondary” purpose or use or otherwise suggested that identifying such a
purpose or use is necessary to its endeavor. See Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d 1262; Adair, 723 F.2d
1394; Walton, 647 F.2d 42.
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the distinction between the original purposes of a federal reservation and later, secondary uses
assigned by statute for the management of lands that had already been reserved.
Having recognized that the United States created a homeland for this Tribe on this
Reservation, see R.4319, the Water Court should have held that the Tribe holds Winters rights
for all uses of water that effectuate this purpose. Instead, the Water Court took the overly narrow
view that only individual activities—and not the provision of a homeland—could be “primary”
purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation that could support federal reserved water rights. In
determining the purpose of the Reservation, the court was obligated to “consider the
[reservation-creating] document and circumstances surrounding its creation, and the history of
the Indians for whom it was created,” as well as “consider [the Indians’] need to maintain
themselves under changed circumstances.” Walton, 647 F.2d at 47 (citing Winans, 198 U.S. at
381). Here, the Water Court wrongly prejudged that the Reservation purpose and attendant water
rights must be narrowly defined, and its analysis failed to credit the Supreme Court’s decision in
Idaho II or the undisputed facts regarding the creation of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. 8
B. The Supreme Court has established that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation’s
purpose includes the Tribe’s use of Reservation waterways, including Lake
Coeur d’Alene, for “food, fiber, transportation, recreation, and cultural
activities.”
The United States and the Tribe claimed sufficient water to maintain the level of Lake
8

Even were this Court to determine that the “primary” purpose of the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation was not to provide a permanent homeland for the Tribe, the following arguments
support multiple primary purposes of the Reservation (instead of various aspects of a general
homeland purpose), each of which supports an implied reservation of water. This approach is
consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which led it to find multiple coexisting primary
purposes supporting implied water reservations in at least two instances. See Walton, 647 F.2d at
47–48 (divining two purposes of the Colville reservation, namely, “to provide a homeland for the
Indians to maintain their agrarian society,” and “preservation of the tribe’s access to fishing
grounds”); Adair, 723 F.2d at 1408–11 (purposes included supporting agriculture and
maintaining hunting and fishing).
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Coeur d’Alene to support the Tribe’s activities on the Lake, all of which serve the Reservation’s
function as homeland for the Tribe. 9 See R.11. The Water Court rejected these claims with
limited discussion. See R.4323–24, 4328. In so doing, the court failed to heed that the Supreme
Court, as part of its determination in Idaho II that the Tribe owns the submerged lands within its
Reservation, confirmed the Tribe’s reliance on a host of traditional activities on the Lake that the
Court summarized as “food, fiber, transportation, recreation, and cultural activities.” 533 U.S. at
265.
The Water Court’s ruling in this regard was erroneous in several respects. First, the Water
Court misunderstood its task when it denied as a matter of law the Tribe’s claim for water rights
to maintain the level of Lake Coeur d’Alene at certain elevations, stating simply that “Lake level
maintenance was not a primary purpose of the reservation.” R.4328. “Lake level” is not itself a
claimed purpose of the reservation, the same as instream flow is not a claimed purpose of the
reservation. See infra Section II. Rather, preservation of the Lake is meant to facilitate specific
traditional uses. And maintaining those uses serves the Reservation’s homeland purpose.
Second, while the Water Court recognized that facilitating the Tribe’s continued hunting
9

The claims for maintenance of Lake level are meant to mirror the natural hydrograph of
the Lake, and, accordingly, would establish a minimum water level to be measured at various
times of the year and would also set a minimum outflow rate necessary to keep the lake from
becoming a stagnant pool. See R.11, 20. This claim is meant to prevent other water users from
draining the Lake below its natural level. As a practical matter, the claimed Lake levels are
below the levels currently maintained under a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission license
for the operation of a hydroelectric facility at Post Falls. But because the water rights in this
basin are being adjudicated now, see Idaho Code § 42-1420, it is critical that minimum Lake
levels be established that will control if and when operations at Post Falls cease. Moreover, the
federal reserved water right is also complementary to longstanding State intent to maintain water
in the Lake for the benefit of the public. Since 1928, the State has held a water right “to maintain
the level of Coeur d’Alene Lake,” see State Water Right 95-2067, available at
https://go.usa.gov/xnF78, which the Idaho Legislature deemed “desirable for all the inhabitants
of the state.” Idaho Code § 67-4304.
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and fishing was a “primary purpose” of the reservation, R.4321–22, it wrongly rejected all other
traditional activities as merely “secondary” and therefore ineligible for a federal reserved water
right. In so doing, the court departed from the Supreme Court’s findings in Idaho II. R.4323–24.
While the Water Court quoted from that decision, it gave no reason for ignoring the part of the
decision that speaks to the very question to be resolved by the Water Court: what is the purpose
of this reservation?
Idaho II posed this question in determining the holder of title to submerged lands
underlying navigable waters on the Reservation. The Supreme Court emphasized that courts
must consider “whether the purpose of the reservation would have been compromised if the
submerged lands had passed to the State” because where that purpose would have been
undermined, “[i]t is simply not plausible that the United States sought to reserve only the upland
portions of the area.” 533 U.S. at 273–74 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court having
determined purposes of the Reservation in Idaho II, those determinations should be followed
here in considering the Tribe’s water rights claims. The Tribe’s longstanding need for the Lake
and related waterways informed the Supreme Court’s decision that the federal government
intended to reserve submerged lands within the Reservation for the Tribe, id. at 274–75, even in
the face of “a strong presumption” that submerged lands would instead pass to the State, id. at
273 (quoting United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 34 (1997)). See also United States v. Idaho,
210 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2000) (“the purpose of the reservation would have been defeated
had it not included submerged lands,” so total was the Tribe’s dependence on its waterways). As
the Supreme Court explained, the Tribe “depended on submerged lands” and used the Lake and
its related waterways for “food, fiber, transportation, recreation, and cultural activities.” Idaho II,
533 U.S. at 265. Indeed, “submerged lands and related water rights had been continuously
important to the Tribe throughout the period prior to congressional action confirming the

20

reservation and granting Idaho statehood,” so much so that the “ ‘Federal Government could only
achieve its goals of promoting settlement, avoiding hostilities and extinguishing aboriginal
title’ ” by meeting the Tribe’s “ ‘demand[]’ ” for “ ‘an enlarged reservation that included the Lake
and rivers.’ ” Id. at 275 (quoting United States v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107 (D. Idaho
1998)).
The district court decision that was ultimately affirmed in Idaho II provides far more
detail about the Tribe’s historical activities and about the importance of the waterways within its
aboriginal territory. 10 The district court described plant gathering in the Lake and other
watercourses, explaining that the waterways in the Tribe’s domain “provided the primary
highways for travel, trade and communication,” and it described the waterways as “tied to the
Tribe’s recreational pursuits, religious ceremonies and burial practices.” 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1099–
1101. That court found that the importance of these waterways led the Tribe to bargain for
“exclusive use” of the water resources upon which it relied. Id. at 1109.
Expert reports on the history of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe further support and build upon
those findings of the Idaho II courts. For instance, historian Ian Smith summarized his findings
about the purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation by observing that “water has been essential
to both the physical and cultural existence of the Tribe for millennia,” with waterways offering
tribal members “an array of materials essential to their sustenance,” but also playing “a
significant role in Coeur d’Alene mythology, language, and cultural practices.” R.638–39. Mr.
Smith described in great detail the Tribe’s take of fish, game, berries, and water potatoes for

10

The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court noted that the State did not challenge that court’s
findings of facts in its unsuccessful appeal. See 210 F.3d at 1070; 533 U.S. at 265 n.1. This Court
recently cited the Idaho II district court decision with approval in Coeur d’Alene Tribe v.
Johnson, 162 Idaho 754 (2017).
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food, R.655–61; its harvest of aquatic grasses used to make mats, baskets, and fishing and
hunting equipment, R.661–63; its reliance on canoes for transportation, R.664; and its deep
cultural ties to the Lake and aquatic environs, R.665–66. Historian Richard Hart similarly
described in great detail the Tribe’s dependence on water resources, see generally R.1430–86,
including the Tribe’s fishing activities, R.1452–67, which were “crucial to the survival of” the
Tribe, R.1466; the Tribe’s use of waterways to aid in the take of deer and other game, R.1468–
70. Mr. Hart concluded that “[v]irtually every aspect of daily life had some relationship to the
rivers and lakes by which the Coeur d’Alene lived,” R.1475, such as the use of waters for
transportation, R.1470–74, for recreation, R.1475, 1477, for gathering food and materials,
R.1475–78, as part of their burial practices, R.1479, all of which “demonstrated [the Tribe’s]
integral connection to and dependence on these water resources,” R.1481.
There was no basis for the Water Court—through the rubric of deciding which of these
Lake uses were “primary” and which “secondary”—to determine that certain of these
longstanding Tribal uses of the Lake are worthy of Winters rights, while others are not. That
rubric imposes a narrow and unsubstantiated view of the Tribe’s “primary” uses of the Lake that
cannot be reconciled with Idaho II’s findings that the Tribe “depended on” the Lake for food,
plants, and transportation and that “the Tribe’s spiritual, religious and social life centered around
the Lake and rivers.” 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1101. There is no evidence to support the Water Court’s
determination that the Tribe agreed to cede its aboriginal territory for a permanent home on the
Reservation without features “essential” to its traditional lifestyle, id. at 1100, and “without
which the Tribe could not have survived,” id. at 1104. This aspect of the Water Court’s decision
must be reversed.
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C. The Water Court erroneously rejected water rights to maintain wetlands, seeps,
and springs to support plant gathering, one of the Tribe’s essential traditional
uses of water within the Reservation.
The United States claimed rights to sufficient water “to maintain wetlands, springs, and
seeps on Tribal lands within the Reservation to provide” habitat that will allow for continued
“Tribal plant gathering.” R.11. The United States presented this gathering-related claim as part of
its traditional-subsistence-activities claim, which also includes hunting and fishing. See, e.g.,
R.2556. While the Water Court correctly held that fishing and hunting were uses for which water
was implicitly reserved at the creation of the Reservation—including maintenance of wetlands,
seeps, springs for the purpose of providing habitat for hunted animals, see R.4302—the court
inexplicably rejected plant gathering as a similarly important purpose of the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation. R.4321–22; R.4480. That determination cannot be squared with the record evidence
that gathering was (and remains) an important Tribal traditional activity that was encompassed in
the homeland purpose of Reservation creation. This Court should reverse and require the
gathering-related claims to proceed to the quantification phase of this adjudication.
The inquiry into whether a tribe is entitled to water rights for subsistence purposes
involves determining whether those subsistence activities were of “historical importance” to the
tribe. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1409. As noted above, the Supreme Court opined in Idaho II, 533
U.S. at 265, on the Coeur d’Alene’s historical activities and the purposes of its Reservation;
among those key uses of the Lake and its shores were harvesting water potatoes. The Idaho II
district court’s undisturbed findings include that the Tribe “gathered several plants growing in
the marshes and wetlands” of the Lake, including the water potato, rushes, and tule, which were
used for food, baskets, mats, and the Tribe’s lodges. 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1100–01. “[P]lant
materials” were among the resources provided by the Lake and rivers that “were essential to the
Coeur d’Alenes’ survival.” Id. at 1101. The district court further found that at the time of the
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Reservation’s creation, “the waterways provided a reliable, year-round source of food, fibre, and
transportation without which the Tribe could not have survived.” Id. at 1104.
Unrebutted expert reports prepared for the present case further document the Tribe’s
extensive historical reliance on the Lake Coeur d’Alene waterways for plant gathering, along
with hunting and fishing. 11 Underscoring its centrality to the Tribe’s survival, Mr. Smith
described gathered plants as “the final pillar of the Coeur d’Alene subsistence cycle,” along with
hunting and fishing. R.659. He detailed the Tribe’s gathering of water potatoes in marshy areas
along the shores of lakes; its reliance on berries gathered along rivers; and its collection of
rushes, tule reeds, and other aquatic grasses, with which tribal members made mats, baskets,
bags, fishing line and other fishing gear, and to construct deer snares. R.660–63. Mr. Hart
similarly described water potatoes harvested from the marsh along the lake shore as a staple of
the Tribal diet that is “spiritually regarded and treated with reverence,” R.1476–78. And he
described the Tribe’s diverse uses of materials found in or alongside rivers and lakes, including
use of hemp for twine and rope, and grasses for mats and bags. R.1475–76. The federal
government was well aware of these activities when it was negotiating with the Tribe regarding
establishment of a reservation: an 1866 report proposing a reservation for the Coeur d’Alene
described the land to be reserved as including “agricultural & grazing lands, with hunting,
fishing, berries & roots, & suitable locations for mills & c.” R.696 (emphasis added). Consistent
with this understanding, the lands included in the 1873 agreement reflected the Tribe’s desire to
incorporate within the Reservation gathering grounds upon which they had relied for centuries.

11

Findings of the various experts in this case about the Tribe’s plant gathering activities
are summarized in the United States’ and Tribe’s Joint Statement of Facts at R.2638–40, ¶¶ 22–
25. The State did not dispute any of the cited findings. See R.3373–75.
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R.2663 ¶ 71. 12 Those gathering activities continued, along with hunting, fishing, and agriculture,
through the end of the 19th Century and beyond. R.740, 743.
The Water Court ignored the Supreme Court’s recognition in Idaho II that gathering was
one of the Tribe’s uses of waters within its territory, and it failed to acknowledge the record
evidence of the critical importance of gathering to the Tribe. Instead, the court focused
exclusively on the Tribe’s 1871 Petition for a reservation, which discussed fishing and hunting
but did not mention gathering. R.4321–22. That Petition is but one piece of evidence among
many, and it was reversible error to dismiss all others, particularly because reserved rights are
recognized by implication and their creation (or the desire for them) need not be expressly
documented. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1409 (finding that tribe entitled to water rights to support
hunting even though other activities—and not hunting—were mentioned in the Tribe’s treaty).
Cf. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (federal government’s
termination of Indians’ recognized rights must be explicit, not by implication). Critically, there is
no evidence that the Tribe or United States intended to exclude from the Reservation the Tribe’s
continued use of these natural resources, as is necessary to overcome the presumption that the
United States intended to allow the Tribe to continue its subsistence practices. See Winans, 198
U.S. at 381. Cf. United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that even
though the nomadic Crow Indians did not traditionally fish, once confined to a reservation, it is
“inconceivable that the United States intended to withhold from the Indians the right to sustain
themselves from any source of food which might be available on their reservation”). 13
12

The State disputed other aspects of this finding of fact, but not the principle for which
it is cited here. See R.3373–74.
13

The Water Court’s rejection of non-consumptive water rights for gathering purposes
while approving consumptive water rights for agriculture yields the counterintuitive result that
the Tribe has no water right to maintain naturally-occurring wetlands and springs in which
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Accordingly, this Court should overturn the Water Court’s exclusion of gathering as a
key tribal subsistence activity supporting a federal reserved water right.
D. The Water Court inappropriately rejected water claims tied to commercial and
industrial use that are essential to the Tribe’s ability to have a permanent, viable
home on their Reservation.
When the United States set aside the Reservation as a permanent homeland for the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe, it impliedly recognized and reserved not only the water necessary for
continuation of the Tribe’s traditional activities but also the water necessary for the Tribe to
maintain self-sufficiency. This meant that the Tribe was (and is) entitled to water necessary to
permit it to develop not only agriculture on the Reservation, but also commercial and industrial
uses. The United States accordingly claimed water rights to support the commercial and
industrial uses that the Tribe has developed and plans to develop. The Water Court rejected those
claims on the ground that (under New Mexico) industrial and commercial uses served only
“secondary” uses of the Reservation and thus could not be the subject of federal reserved water
rights. R.4323–24. This ruling fails to recognize that establishing a permanent homeland for the
Coeur d’Alene Tribe meant ensuring that the Tribe had the resources it would need to establish
self-sufficiency, allowing for flexibility and changed uses over time.
As a threshold matter, and as discussed above, the Water Court misapplied New Mexico
and should have acknowledged that the original purpose of the Reservation remains its
“primary” purpose and, further, that the original purpose of the Reservation was to provide a
homeland for the tribe under Winters. Critically, too, the Supreme Court has also directed that a
reservation of water must meet a Tribe’s future needs. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600; see also
United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist, 236 F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1956) (implied reservation of
harvestable plants grow, but does have the right to divert water from rivers and streams in order
to unnaturally irrigate lands on which these plants would not normally grow.
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water “looked to the needs of the Indians in the future”); Finch, 548 F.2d at 832 (rights reserved
to Tribes need not be tied to traditional uses); Greely, 712 P.2d at 767, 768 (reservation includes
“water for future needs and changes in use” and serves “the federal goal of Indian self
sufficiency”). The Supreme Court of Arizona has explored the issue of rights tied to tribal
economic development more thoroughly than most other courts, and in doing so started from this
same uncontroversial premise: creating “a ‘permanent home and abiding place’ for the Indian
people,” is a “broad” purpose that must be “liberally construed” to allow “tribes to achieve the
twin goals of Indian self-determination and economic self-sufficiency.” Gila V, 35 P.3d at 76
(quoting Walton, 647 F.2d at 47). Accordingly, “nothing should prevent tribes from diversifying
their economies if they so choose and are reasonably able to do so.” Id. Thus, determining the
quantity of water necessary to ensuring the “permanent homeland” purpose requires a court to
consider “the optimal manner of creating jobs and income for the tribes [and] the most efficient
use of the water.” Id. at 79, 80 (internal quotation marks omitted).
That water for commercial and industrial activities was impliedly reserved for the Coeur
d’Alene in 1873 is consistent with the Arizona Supreme Court’s approach to recognizing tribal
rights to water for forward-looking economic development and is also supported by the specific
record in this case, as the State has conceded. See R.2504 (State acknowledgment before Water
Court that “One Purpose of the Reservation was to Promote Commercial and Industrial
Activities,” citing the 1891 Act that confirms and builds upon the purposes established in the
1873 agreement). The documents surrounding the Reservation’s creation recognize the move
toward then-modern (as distinguished from traditional) practices, particularly agriculture as at
least a supplement to the Tribe’s traditional hunting, fishing, and gathering practices. See
R.2641–42, ¶ 29; R.701, 715; R.782–92. The 1873 agreement stated that the government would
provide, among other things, wagons, plows, mowers, a grain cradler, and a grist mill. See

27

R.2642, ¶ 30; R.1866. The government agreed to furnish “1 grist and 1 saw miller and 1
blacksmith,” and those government employees would “teach the Indians to perform such labor.”
R.1866. The Tribe’s 1885 petition for a “proper treaty” conveyed its awareness of the changing
world, and requested “grist and saw mills, proper farming implements, and mechanics to help to
teach us and our children proper industrial pursuits, and the use of tools in connection
therewith.” R.1871. The 1887 Agreement (ratified in 1891) provides further evidence of federal
intent to support then-modern activities: the government agreed that as soon as possible after
ratification, “there shall be erected on said reservation a saw and grist mill, to be operated by
steam, and an engineer and miller employed” at the government’s expense. R.1874; Act of Mar.
3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1028. Further funds would “be expended in the purchase of such useful
and necessary articles as shall best promote the progress, comfort, improvement, education, and
civilization” of the Tribe. R.1874; 26 Stat. at 1028. The government would also furnish “a
competent physician, medicines, a blacksmith, and carpenter.” R.1875; 26 Stat. at 1029. And the
government agreed that “all millers, engineers, and mechanics” employed on the Reservation
would “teach all Indians placed under their charge their trades and vocations.” R.1875; 26 Stat.
at 1028. Thus, while it is clear that the Coeur d’Alene and federal government were concerned
with the Tribe’s ability to continue their traditional activities on a Reservation, they focused also
on the Tribe’s ability to undertake new activities in the future. The introduction of technology on
the Reservation, the stated goals of “progress, . . . improvement, . . . and civilization,” R.1874,
and the emphasis on teaching skills that would help the Tribe become more self-sufficient all
make clear that all parties understood that a purpose of the Reservation was to help the Tribe
survive in a changing world.
This concept is a logical outgrowth of the commonly-accepted idea that tribes need not be
confined to their traditional methods of hunting or agricultural production or to antiquated

28

industrial technologies. For instance, “treaties did not in any way . . . restrict the treaty fishers to
using technology that was in existence at the time of the treaty.” Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa
& Chippewa Indians v. Dir., Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 141 F.3d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1998). Tribes’
use of water cannot be required to remain frozen in the past, just as “[o]ther right holders are not
constrained . . . to use water in the same manner as their ancestors in the 1800s,” Gila V, 35 P.3d
at 86. That a water right supports a Tribe’s modern, rather than historical, use does not “destroy
its right” to that water now. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1272 (citing Walton, 647 F.2d at 51).
Rather, “permitting the Indians to determine how to use reserved water is consistent with the
general purpose for the creation of an Indian reservation providing a homeland for the survival
and growth of the Indians and their way of life.” Walton, 647 F.2d at 49. And “modern”
activities did not include only agriculture: “Congress envisioned agricultural pursuits as only a
first step in the ‘civilizing’ process. This vision of progress implies a flexibility of purpose.” Id.
at 47 n.9 (omitting citation to 11 Cong. Rec. 905 (1881)); see also In re Crow Water Compact,
364 P.3d 584, 589 (Mont. 2015) (concluding that “under Winters and its progeny the tribe has a
right to water for development of industrial interests”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2472 (2016).
The reserved water rights on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation have not previously been
quantified, and the Tribe has now developed and planned commercial and industrial activities
and corresponding water uses aimed toward achieving long-term economic self-sufficiency.
Those current and proposed activities should be used as a proxy in quantifying the amount of
water reserved to the Tribe. But that question—the quantity of water reserved for the general
commercial-industrial purpose—will be determined in the next, quantification phase of litigation
before the Water Court; all that is currently at issue is whether the Tribe’s reserved water rights
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include water for commercial and industrial activities. 14
The Water Court’s rigid interpretation of the scope of permissible water rights for
“modern” activities erroneously eliminated commercial and industrial uses, thereby depriving the
Tribe of the flexibility required to accomplish its long-term economic self-sufficiency. This
Court must reverse the Water Court’s ruling to correct this error.
***
The Water court erred here by taking a too-restrictive approach to determining the
purpose or purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, a starting-point that led it to erroneously
dismiss water rights that serve the Reservation’s core purpose: providing a permanent homeland
for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe. Recognizing this core purpose should have led the court to rule that
water was implicitly reserved for a suite of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s traditional activities
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, and for modern uses not limited to agriculture. This
Court should reverse, and rule that the Coeur d’Alene Tribe is entitled to water to fulfill all
aspects of this homeland purpose, which requires enough water to satisfy both the present and
the future needs of the Tribe.
II.

The Tribe has a right to maintain instream flows outside Reservation boundaries
that are essential to on-Reservation fishing activities, an acknowledged purpose of
the Reservation.
The United States claimed water rights for the Tribe both within and outside of the

Reservation’s boundaries to support the Tribe’s fishing activities. These non-consumptive water
14

The United States claims consumptive water rights to support present commercial
activities (including a casino, hotel, and golf course) and future commercial and industrial
activities (including a fish hatchery) on the Reservation. See R.9–10. These rights were perfected
at the time of Reservation establishment, before these specific activities began. The entitlement
to water for commercial and industrial development does not depend on these specific
commercial and industrial uses. But they are currently the best evidence of the quantity of water
necessary for present and future development, an issue not yet before this Court.
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rights are necessary for the fish species harvested by the Tribe within its Reservation boundaries,
and so they are a necessary part of the implied reservation of water to facilitate that use of
Reservation resources. While the Water Court properly recognized the importance to the Tribe of
Lake Coeur d’Alene and associated waterways for fishing, its narrow decision ignores the
practical reality that the continued viability of this use depends on the maintenance of upstream
habitat without which the fish cannot survive. The Water Court correctly recognized that “the
Tribe’s need to access the waterways to facilitate its traditional fishing and hunting practices”
was at the forefront of the Tribe’s negotiations for its Reservation. R.4321. Cf. Pocatello, 180
P.3d at 1056 (opining that although the interpretation of an Indian treaty or agreement is a
question of law, “examination of a treaty’s negotiating history and purpose . . . serves as an aid to
the legal determination”). Indeed, the Tribe’s rejection of the 1867 Reservation was based in part
on the failure of that reservation to adequately provide for this necessary use. Idaho II, 533 U.S.
at 265–66. As the Water Court explained, moreover, the United States recognized that there
would be “trouble” with the Tribe if its fishing activities were not protected; in negotiation for
establishment of the Reservation, the government intended “to avoid such trouble” while also
clearing the way for non-Indian settlement of the Tribe’s aboriginal territory. R.4322. The
resulting agreement between the Tribe and United States led to creation of a Reservation that
included portions of Lake Coeur d’Alene, the Coeur d’Alene River, and the St. Joe River. Id.
The Water Court acknowledged that the very location of the Reservation was tailored to serve
the key hunting and fishing purposes of the Reservation and that in creating the Reservation, the
United States impliedly reserved water rights necessary to fulfill those purposes. Id.
But the Water Court drew an unsupported and arbitrary line when it approved only
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fishing-related claims for instream flows that are within, and not without, the Reservation. 15
R.4324. It arrived at this conclusion via four errors: first, it failed to recognize the practical
similarity between traditional water rights and the disallowed “off-reservation” instream flow
rights; second, it incorrectly attributed significance to a lack of specific historical support for the
notion that a “primary” purpose of the Reservation was to protect off-Reservation fish habitat;
third, it misapplied the Tribe’s agreement that it would extinguish all off-Reservation rights; and
fourth, it incorrectly opined that off-Reservation flows could not be reserved as a matter of law
because they were not “appurtenant” to the Reservation. R.4324–26. The Water Court’s ruling
on this issue misunderstands the applicable law and is contrary to reason. Once it correctly
recognized that the United States impliedly reserved water to support the Tribe’s fishing rights,
the Water Court should further have recognized that the United States impliedly reserved
adequate water to ensure off-Reservation habitat to support on-Reservation fishing, the
accomplishment of which requires fishing-related instream flows that are outside the boundaries
of the Reservation.
A. Even on-reservation rights can impact competing off-reservation uses.
The Water Court agreed with objectors that no instream flow claims could be recognized
for locations outside of the Tribe’s current Reservation boundaries. That holding is mistaken
because the practical effect of recognizing such claims is the same as with recognizing other
water rights. Indeed, the idea that a water right-holder’s rights might limit the conduct of
others—even those geographically distant—is common to all water right adjudications: a senior
right-holder will always, at least in theory, limit the activities of others on a hydrologically-

15

Importantly, the United States and Tribe are not claiming a right of the Tribe to
physically access these upstream waters for fishing. Instead, the “off-Reservation” instream flow
claims are meant solely to support the Tribe’s on-Reservation fishery.
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connected waterway, because the senior owner’s ability to recoup the full share of his water
rights may limit the water available for junior right-holders. See, e.g., Moe v. Harger, 77 P. 645
(Idaho 1904).
Likewise, here, the Tribe’s right to a continued on-Reservation fishery limits upstream
users from dewatering a stream to the extent that it interferes with that fishery. Not only did the
Water Court fail to appreciate that this situation mirrors every situation in which there are senior
and junior water right-holders, the historical record here directly contemplates that Tribal rights
could enjoin off-Reservation activities: “the 1873 agreement guarantees ‘that the water running
into said reservation shall not be turned from their natural channel where they enter said
reservation,’ ” which demonstrates the importance of retaining water flows to support the
Reservation. Idaho II, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1108. Simply put, there is no reason that a Tribe’s onReservation rights may not limit off-Reservation activities by others whose exercise of junior
rights would limit flows and thereby impair the Tribe’s protected on-Reservation uses.
B. Instream flows are necessary to ensure the availability of a viable fishery, and
fishing is key to preserving the Coeur d’Alene Reservation as a tribal homeland.
Next, by asking whether reservation of off-Reservation instream flows was a “primary”
purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, the Water Court framed its inquiry in a way that
could never have led to a favorable answer for the Tribe. The proper question is not, as the Water
Court asked, whether a specific reservation of water is a purpose of the Reservation’s creation.
The proper question rather is what water is needed to support the Tribe’s use of the Reservation
as a homeland (or the specific activities that individually constitute the purposes of the
Reservation, if this Court rejects the homeland concept). Had the Water Court properly framed
the question, it would have arrived at the correct answer. The court had already determined that
fishing is a core part of the Tribe’s use of the Reservation, and thus should have also recognized
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that the implied reservation of water includes water sufficient to support that use, both at the time
of the Reservation’s creation and into the future. Indeed, the court approved instream flows on
the Reservation, demonstrating that it understood (at least implicitly) the biological need for this
water. R.4481–82.
It is undisputed that the Coeur d’Alene fisheries are biologically dependent on waterways
beyond the boundaries of the Reservation. R.594. And the specific instream flows claimed for
fish habitat are tied directly to the Tribe’s fishing use and the dependence of that use on these
off-Reservation areas. The strong biological basis for these claims stands unchallenged: fisheries
scientist Dr. Dudley Reiser explained that Westslope Cutthroat Trout and Bull Trout—two
species that the Tribe historically harvested, R.2676; R.571—are adfluvial species, which means
that their life strategy requires access to and movement through properly-functioning lake and
riverine habitats, R.2677, R.593. The movements of these species occur, of course, without
regard to title or political boundaries; they are instead restrained by physical barriers like natural
waterfalls, turbulent rapids, or dewatered streams. R.2677; R.562. Relevant here, this life history
strategy means that these species spend a substantial part of their lifecycle in Lake Coeur
d’Alene, but they seek suitable spawning habitat by migrating upstream in rivers and streams
located off-Reservation. See R.2676; R.577–78. Young fish continue to live in these upstream
areas for years before migrating back downstream to the Lake. R.2676; R.577. These spawning
areas are widely distributed within the Coeur d’Alene Basin: fish may travel from a few miles to
more than a hundred miles in search of suitable spawning habitat. R.578. Beyond providing
required habitat for the adfluvial fish that are part of the Coeur d’Alene fisheries, these connected
rivers and streams also support subpopulations of these species that contribute genetic diversity
and thus help ensure survival of the fish population as a whole. R.593. Collectively, the
watersheds represented in the instream flow claims represent waters upon which the Coeur
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d’Alene Tribe traditionally relied for fishing. See R.561–64.
Other courts have readily accepted this same type of biological evidence in determining
tribal rights. For instance, in Kittitas Reclamation District v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District,
763 F.2d 1032, 1033–35 (9th Cir. 1985), the Yakima Nation sought protection for stream flows
that provide salmon spawning habitat. The Ninth Circuit recognized the need for sufficient water
to support the spawning portion of the salmon’s lifecycle even though the stream flows at issue
were 50 miles from the Yakima Reservation. Id. In the subsequent adjudication of the Yakima
River Basin, the state court confirmed that water rights extend beyond the boundary of that
reservation to support the fishery’s migratory lifecycle. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v. Acquavella,
No. 77-2-01484-5, slip op. at 9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1994), available at R.2308. Kittitas
involved both on- and off-reservation treaty fishing rights—as opposed to a reservation created
with an eye to providing for fishing on-reservation—yet the concept that water is necessary to
the continued vitality of a fishery is equally applicable here. That same logic led the Ninth
Circuit to hold that where the purposes of a tribe’s reservation included maintaining and
reestablishing fishing, the “right to water to establish and maintain the [fishery] includes the right
to sufficient water to permit natural spawning of the trout.” Walton, 647 F.2d at 48.
Although the Water Court correctly recognized that fishing was a key tribal use of the
Reservation, that bare recognition is rendered meaningless if the fishery does not remain vital.
The off-Reservation instream flow claims here are intended to ensure that this recognized
purpose of the Reservation is not undermined by loss of habitat upon which the fishery depends.
R.10. The Tribe historically depended and still depends on these fish species, see R.2676;
R.562–63, and these species depend on these waterways—including rivers, streams, and portions
of Lake Coeur d’Alene outside the Reservation boundary—for spawning, see R.594. In other
words, the Tribe’s fishing activities within the Reservation are reliant on these fish species’
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access to and use of adequate habitat outside the Reservation. R.594. Thus, even accepting the
Water Court’s application of New Mexico, the off-Reservation stream flow claims effectuate one
of the primary purposes of the Reservation and should have been approved.
C. The Water Court erroneously determined that the Tribe could hold no offreservation rights of any kind and incorrectly interpreted the “appurtenancy”
requirement.
As another basis for its erroneous denial of certain instream flow claims, the Water Court
incorrectly determined that the Tribe retained no off-Reservation rights of any kind based on the
Tribe’s land cessions. The Tribe’s 1873 and 1887 agreements with the federal government
provide that the Tribe would “relinquish . . . all their right and title in and to all of the lands
heretofore claimed by them” outside the new Reservation, and would cede “all right, title, and
claim . . . to all lands” outside the present reservation. R.1865; R.1873 (emphasis added). As a
textual matter, the limited references to relinquishing rights to “lands” outside the reservation
cannot be fairly understood as an agreement to cede water rights necessary for accomplishing
Reservation purposes. Cf. Mille Lacs Band, 526 U.S. at 195–96 (finding no abrogation of former
treaty rights in the absence of express language because federal “treaty drafters had the
sophistication and experience to use express language”). As a practical matter, the Tribe could
not have understood its agreement for a Reservation that would give them continued use of their
traditional fishery to leave the Tribe with so little assurance of the continued viability of the
fishery upon which it depended, particularly in the absence of any language so indicating. Cf.
Winans, 198 U.S. at 371 (holding that a Tribe retains all rights not specifically ceded, because a
reservation of rights is not as a grant of rights to a tribe, but a reservation of rights not granted to
the government).
Finally, the Water Court misapplied the legal premise that a water right should be
“appurtenant” to a reservation in holding that off-reservation flows could not be impliedly
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reserved. R.4325–36 (citing Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976)). The court
focused exclusively on the geographic location of the claimed water right vis-à-vis the
Reservation lands, but “appurtenancy” is a conceptual, not a physical, requirement. The Ninth
Circuit recently explained this concept in Katie John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214, 1229–30
(9th Cir. 2013), which held that off-reservation waters may be tied to reserved lands. In so
determining, the court found “an apparent consensus that [appurtenancy] does not mean physical
attachment” of water to land. Id. Instead, “appurtenancy” has to do with the “relationship
between reserved federal land and the use of the water, not the location of the water.” Id. at 1230
(emphasis added). 16 This understanding of the appurtenancy requirement accords with the
Supreme Court’s recognition of water rights for irrigation of reservation lands from a water
source two miles from the reservation boundary. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 344–45
(1964) (“Arizona II”). In any event, Cappaert supports the United States’ claim here and
undermines the Water Court’s view. In that case, the Supreme Court agreed that the federal
government’s implicit reservation of water for Devil’s Hole National Monument included
“appurtenant water sufficient to maintain the level” of an underground pool, affirming an
injunction that limited the pumping of groundwater by private citizens 2.5 miles away from the
pool. 426 U.S. at 133, 141, 147. This off-reservation limitation on use to serve on-reservation
uses of water is directly analogous to, and supports recognition of, the instream flows claimed
here for the Tribe.
Accordingly, because the Water Court failed to credit evidence that the continued

16

The Ninth Circuit’s explanation in Agua Caliente that federally reserved water rights
must be “appurtenant” to, or “attached to,” a reservation did not alter or even test this holding of
Katie John, since Agua Caliente involved groundwater that “underlies” the reservation at issue
there. 849 F.3d at 1271 & n. 10.
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viability of the Tribe’s on-Reservation fishing activities depends on maintenance of instream
flows upstream, the court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the Tribe is disqualified from
holding off-Reservation water rights. Its ruling in this regard should be reversed.
III.

The priority date for water rights in seeps, springs, and wetlands is time
immemorial, regardless whether those features are on lands that were sold and later
reacquired.
In addition to determining the broad categories of reserved water rights to which the

Tribe is entitled, the Water Court also determined the priority date that should attach to these
categories of rights. In its summary judgment order, the Water Court correctly determined that
the Tribe’s non-consumptive water rights for fishing and hunting have a time-immemorial
priority date, recognizing that these uses are traditional subsistence activities that the Tribe has
practiced since long before Reservation establishment. R.4321–22, 4327. But after the State and
other objectors moved for reconsideration of the priority date for certain of these rights, the
Water Court ruled that water rights at seeps, springs, and wetlands on Reservation would have a
date-of-reacquisition priority date where they were allotted, sold to non-Indians, and later
reacquired by the Tribe. R.4474. This exception potentially swallows up the ruling of a timeimmemorial priority date for traditional uses of seeps, springs, and wetlands because of the broad
extent of allotment on the Reservation. No law compelled the Water Court to reach this legal
conclusion, and a better approach—one that best effectuates the purposes of this Reservation—
would recognize that Reservation lands, even those owned at some point in history by nonIndians, have special status that warrants preservation of the original priority date.
As explained above, a majority of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was alienated from
Tribal control during the allotment era, as vast quantities of “surplus” land were granted to nonIndian homesteaders, and many allotments left Indian hands through sale, forfeiture, or loss.
Allotment of this Reservation occurred over the objection of the Tribe, and its effects are still
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being felt, as the Tribe has embarked upon and continues its efforts to reacquire lands lost during
the decades of allotment policy. See R.3108–10. But despite the broad alienation of lands
formerly controlled by the Tribe, allotted and homesteaded lands within the Reservation
boundaries remained and remain Reservation lands. See United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278,
285 (1909). When these Reservation lands return to tribal control, they once again contribute to
the Reservation purpose, for which the water rights were originally reserved and continue to
serve.
Generally, when Reservation lands were held by allottees or homesteaders, rights to
water associated with these lands depended the lands’ status. Indian allottees took a ratable share
of the Reservation Winters water rights for irrigation and domestic purposes, United States v.
Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939), preserving the water right’s priority date, Walton, 647 F.2d at
51. The Indian allottee could sell his or her allotment to a non-Indian along with the full quantum
of that ratable share of water. But while the allottee’s Winters right would never be lost through
non-use, a non-Indian successor in ownership would need to preserve the right through beneficial
use. Walton, 647 F.2d at 51; United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1984).
Homesteaders would not acquire a Winters right at all, but would instead have to establish water
rights with their own priority date under state law. See Pocatello, 180 P.3d at 1054.
But non-consumptive water rights, such as those claimed here for seeps, springs, and
wetlands that support the Tribe’s traditional activities, are different from consumptive rights for
irrigation and domestic uses. This type of water right may never be held by a non-Indian, nor
may it be established or maintained under state law. See, e.g., Adair, 723 F.2d at 1418. The
Water Court took these precepts to mean that such a right could not survive on lands that had
been homesteaded or allotted and later reacquired. But the special status of these rights should
have led the court to the opposite conclusion, namely, that these collectively-held rights may
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have remained dormant during the period of non-tribal ownership, but they once again contribute
to the overall homeland purpose of the Reservation once back in tribal hands and accordingly
maintain their original priority date.
The Water Court’s application of Anderson likewise rests on a failure to appreciate the
fundamental difference between consumptive rights (such as for irrigation), which can be held by
individuals and transferred to non-Indians, see Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1362, and nonconsumptive rights (such as for maintenance of springs and wetlands), which are held by and for
the communal benefit of the Tribe generally and may not be severed, individually held, or sold,
see Adair, 723 F.2d at 1418. Anderson held that irrigation rights for allotted or homesteaded
rights have a date-of-reacquisition priority date. But Anderson is not properly understood to
apply to anything other than claims for consumptive agricultural rights. 17 The district court in
Anderson had found both agricultural and fishing purposes of the reservation at issue in that case,
and assigned a priority date for the non-consumptive instream flow rights of “at the latest . . . the
date of the creation of the reservation.” United States v. Anderson, No. 3643, Slip op. 10 (E.D.
Wash. July 23, 1979), available at R.2908. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered only the
priority date for consumptive uses (i.e., water for irrigation) on reservation lands that had been
allotted or homesteaded and later reacquired by the Tribe. 18

17

The Wyoming Supreme Court answered this question differently, holding that
agricultural claims that serve reacquired allotments maintain a date-of-reservation priority date
“[b]ecause all the reacquired lands on the ceded portion of the reservation are reservation lands
. . . the same reserved water rights apply.” See In re Gen. Adjud. of All Rights to Use Water in the
Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 114 (Wyo. 1988).
18

The decision does not explicitly state that it involves only water for irrigation, but
references to an allottee’s/successor’s right to water “limited by the number of irrigable acres,”
which may be lost if not “put[] to beneficial use” makes the context clear. See Anderson, 736
F.2d at 1362.
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The Anderson decision on which the Water Court relied addressed only consumptive
water claims for irrigation and does not distinguish between treatment of consumptive and nonconsumptive water reservations. In other cases, however, the Ninth Circuit has made clear the
distinction between treatment of consumptive and non-consumptive water reservations. For
instance, in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1985), the court
explained that water for non-consumptive use was not subject to individual ownership: “This
quantity of water, unrelated to irrigation, was not affected by the allotment of reservation lands
and passage of title out of the Indians’ hands.” Cf. Walton, 647 F.2d at 47–48 (“a ratable share
of . . . water reserved for irrigation” could be subject to individual ownership and transfer). And
in Adair, that court similarly made clear that water tied to non-consumptive uses is not subject to
transfers: “The hunting and fishing rights themselves belong to the Tribe and may not be
transferred to a third party” and thus “no subsequent transferee may acquire that right of use or
the reserved water necessary to fulfill that use.” 723 F.2d at 1418. The non-transferability of nonconsumptive water rights renders Anderson’s priority-date analysis inapplicable to the rights to
non-consumptive maintenance of seeps, springs, and wetlands. The Water Court’s reliance on
Anderson was thus erroneous.
By failing to recognize the original priority date for those lands’ associated nonconsumptive Winters rights, the Water Court has limited those lands’ contribution to the original
Reservation purposes served by Winters rights. Reacquired lands have always been part of the
Reservation, and they again serve the Reservation purpose once back in tribal ownership. In the
case of the non-consumptive rights at issue here, this means these lands once again provide
habitat for fish and game and support the Tribe’s gathering and cultural activities. Those
traditional activities supported a Winters right with a time-immemorial priority date, which
recognizes that the reservation of lands for the Tribe was a grant of rights from, and not to, the
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Tribe. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675; Pocatello, 180 P.3d at 1057. It is of no moment that
federal allotment policy resulted in these lands’ temporary alienation from tribal control; once
returned to the Tribe, they once again become part of the network of lands that allow
continuation of these traditional activities on the Reservation. Recognition of a time-immemorial
priority date for these non-consumptive uses best allows the continuity of this Reservation
purpose. This result is also most consistent with the stated policy—including “[t]o conserve and
develop Indian lands and resources”—of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the law that
ended allotment and homesteading of the Coeur d’Alene reservation and allowed reacquisition of
Reservation land for the Tribe. 48 Stat. at 984.
Accordingly the Water Court erred in applying a date-of-reacquisition priority date for
non-consumptive water rights.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the decision of the Water Court
insofar as it (1) rejected the United States’ water claims not directly tied to hunting, fishing,
domestic, and agricultural uses; (2) rejected its claims for instream flow off of Reservation lands;
and (3) imposed an improper priority date on Reservation lands that have been reacquired by the
Tribe.
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